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Abstract 
The Jakarta Gubernatorial Election 2017 is an important momentum for improving and evaluating 
the quality of democracy at the local level. Various issues of religion, ethnicity, as well as 
differences in political support, colored both in the first and second round. Anies-Sandi's victory 
in this local election is interesting to study further by using the political representation approach 
by Olle Törnquist. The results of this study showed that voters have been polarized through 
strengthening religious and ethnic sentiments so it can be ignored the factor of achievement, 
capacity, and track record of candidates. Extensive efforts to spread identity politics were carried 
out through various movements and actors. The quality of political participation among DKI 
Jakarta residents can also be seen from the extent of voter autonomy and literacy in determining 
positions. Based on those results, a critical discussion of the Jakarta Gubernatorial Election 2017 
will be a reflection of useful learning to observe the political climate, which transform relation to 
connect or disconnect relations between constituent and their representative. 
Keywords: identity; local democracy; transformative politics; Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. 
Abstrak 
Pemilihan Gubernur DKI Jakarta 2017 menjadi momentum penting untuk meningkatkan dan 
mengevaluasi kualitas demokrasi di tingkat lokal. Berbagai isu terkait agama, etnis, serta 
perbedaan dukungan politik turut mewarnai baik di putaran pertama maupun kedua. Kemenangan 
Anies-Sandi dalam pemilukada ini menarik untuk diteliti lebih lanjut dengan menggunakan 
pendekatan representasi politik yang dikemukakan oleh Olle Törnquist. Hasil penelitian ini 
menunjukkan bahwa voters telah terpolarisasi melalui menguatnya sentimen agama dan etnisitas 
sehingga seolah mengabaikan faktor prestasi, kapasitas, dan rekam jejak kandidat. Upaya luas 
untuk menyebarkan politik identitas dilakukan melalui berbagai gerakan dan aktor. Kualitas 
partisipasi politik di antara penduduk DKI Jakarta juga dapat dilihat dari tingkat otonomi dan 
literasi pemilih dalam menentukan posisi. Berdasarkan temuan tersebut, tinjauan kritis dari 
Pemilihan Gubernur DKI Jakarta 2017 menjadi refleksi pembelajaran berharga untuk meninjau 
iklim politik dimana dapat mentransformasi relasi untuk memperkuat atau justru memutuskan 
hubungan antara konstituen dengan wakil politiknya. 
Kata kunci: identitas; demokrasi lokal; politik transformative; PilGub DKI Jakarta. 
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A. Introduction 
Based on the fourth amendment of the Indonesian Constitution (UUD) 1945, 
Indonesia has three types of electoral events: legislative elections, presidential elections, 
and local elections. Election complexity varies greatly depending on the electoral system, 
the management of the election, the candidates, and the level of voter literacy regarding 
the election. Elections in Indonesia are political events that are repeated every five years. 
Since 2005, direct local elections (one man one vote) have been held at the provincial, 
regency, and city levels not only for legislature membership, but also for filling 
gubernatorial, regent, and mayoral positions. Local communities can use their political 
rights to participate and directly vote on their area's local leadership. In this way, the spirit 
to bring closer relations between leaders and local society can be realized, and democracy 
can be strengthened at the local level. 
The implementation of direct local elections is also a political step undertaken in 
the reform era to concretize Law No. 32 of 2004 about Local Government. Some quite 
fundamental changes have been made to local elections in Indonesia, especially to their 
mechanisms and how local leaders are elected directly.1 The implementation of direct 
local elections is considered a breakthrough in the organization of local democracy within 
the framework of political liberalization. This change is expected to minimize the gap 
between the people's desires and the candidates running. As such, during the transition 
period, direct local elections are an important part of decentralization and regional 
autonomy. The election of leaders at the local level is expected to create clean local 
governance, provide citizens equal rights in politics, and open space for the Indonesian 
people to become actively involved in politics as an effort to strengthen national 
democracy. The local leaders can be produced through direct local elections and the 
greater commitment of local leaders will realize the goals of local autonomy. 
The implementation of local election was strengthened in the various regions in 
Indonesia, especially a decade later, in 2015, when Law No. 8 of 2015 on the Amendment 
of Law No. 1 of 2015 about the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 
1 of 2014 about the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors. Ratification of this law 
followed the passing of Law No. 23 of 2014 about Local Government as a replacement 
for Law No. 32 of 2004. Ratification of this rule had political consequences on the 
simultaneous conduction of local elections throughout all regions of Indonesia. Article 
201, paragraphs 1–7 of Law No. 8 of 2015, states that simultaneous local election 
(pemillukada serentak) are to be held in seven waves (2015, 2017, 2018, 2020, 2022, 
2023, and 2027) and held on the same day, date, month, and year in some areas of 
Indonesia. Each wave of elections is intended to adjust the end of the regional leaders' 
term. 
 
1 See Budi F. Hardiman. “Demokrasi Deliberatif: Model untuk Indonesia Pasca-Soeharto?”, Majalah 
Basis No. 11-12 (2004). 
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Simultaneous local elections have become a new chapter in local democracy. 
Simultaneous elections were born of the idea and spirit of improving the quality of local 
elections, which had been perceived as capitalistic and transactional.2 Simultaneous 
elections were not intended merely as a matter of dates, months, and years coinciding with 
other regions to simplify election timing, but rather to emphasize the quality and maturity 
of local democracy and elections. This is consistent with the statement by Brian C. Smith 
and Robert Dahl who mention that local accountability, political equity, and 
responsiveness are at stake in every region as it builds democracy at the local level.3 As 
such, concurrent local elections are expected to be the first step to building a more stable 
and effective local government order, one that is capable of improving social, political 
and economic conditions. Such elections are also intended to organize the national 
election cycle. 
From various simultaneous local elections that have been carried out in 2017, in 
this paper, the DKI Jakarta elections 2017 will be the focus of this research and it is 
important to study it more deeply. The author aware that a similar study has been 
investigated quite intensively by the previous researcher, for example: First, the rise of 
Islamic identity politics takes place through efforts to develop self-image and uphold self-
esteem as humiliated Muslims so they must choose those who have the same religion. 
This is to build psychology as a wounded majority as well as a space to build the majority 
power limit to those who are seen as minorities to maintain the demarcation of power in 
the name of religion.4 Second, in the election of the DKI Jakarta governor in 2017, with a 
certain identity, prospective candidates could carry out bargaining positions. This shows 
that ethnic and religious factors are significant enough to get support and influence 
people's choices.5  
When compared with other similar studies, the novelty offered in this study are: 
First, this study will examine the phenomena based on political representation model by 
Olle Törnquist. Second, this study offers a detailed chronological analysis by comparing 
the initiator and demands of each Islamic Defender Action (Aksi Bela Islam) to dissect the 
political motives behind the action. Third, this study will critically analyze how political 
transformation in Indonesia's local democracy in the future is related to the strengthening 
of the issue of identity politics. 
 
 
2 See Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (eds.). Politik Uang di Indonesia: Patronase dan 
Klientelisme di Pemilu Legislatif 2014. (Yogyakarta: PolGov UGM, 2015).  
3 Idil Akbar. “Pilkada Serentak dan Geliat Dinamika Politik dan Pemerintahan Lokal Indonesia”. 
CosmoGov: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan Vol. 2 No. 1 (2016). 95-110. 
4 Endang Sari. “Kebangkitan Politik Identitas Islam Pada Arena Pemilihan Gubernur Jakarta”. 
Kritis: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Vol. 2 No. 2, (2016). 
5 Andy Prima Sahalatua et al. “Politik Identitas dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Studi Kasus pada 
Pemilihan Gubernur DKI Jakarta Periode 2017-2022)”. Prosiding Seminar Nasional Prodi Ilmu 
Pemerintahan, (2018). 
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B. Religion, Ethnicity, and the Political Dynamics in Jakarta 2017 
Before 2017, the Indonesian Elections Commission (KPU) had succeeded in 
conducting the first wave of simultaneous local elections on December 9, 2015, followed 
by 9 provinces, 224 regencies, and 36 cities; and the second wave of elections, held on 
February 15, 2017 and followed by 7 provinces, 76 regencies, and 18 cities. The 
complexity of the issue also colored the implementation of the Jakarta Gubernatorial 
Election in 2017. This election entered the spotlight of various groups, both domestically 
and abroad, because Jakarta is the miniature of Indonesia. This public spotlight cannot be 
separated from the printed, electronic, and social media's incessant competition in 
reporting data, facts, and hoaxes regarding the three pairs of gubernatorial and vice-
gubernatorial candidates: First, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono and Sylviana Murni (Agus–
Sylvi); second, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and Djarot Saiful Hidayat (Ahok–Djarot); third, 
Anies Rasyid Baswedan and Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno (Anies–Sandi). News about the 
Jakarta election was more prominent than election news from regencies and cities 
throughout Indonesia.6 Indeed, coverage of the Jakarta election gave the impression that 
it was the only election being contested, as it managed to seize the attention of various 
layers of society. Persons throughout Indonesia followed the election process, from 
candidate nominations until the end of the second round.  
The hopes and support of Jakarta residents were polarized for or against each 
gubernatorial and vice gubernatorial candidate. News in various media bring out the 
picture that this polarization emerged because of various factors, including: the existence 
of emotional connections (religious, ethnicity, racial, etc.); political relations (equality of 
policymakers); common vision and mission; etc. Over time, this polarization became 
stronger and increased the political temperature in Jakarta. Various rumors were 
manipulated to attack candidates. Of the many rumors reported, the one of religious 
defamation proved effective in spreading hatred and strengthening identity sentiments and 
sensitivity within the community during the first and second round of elections. This 
condition is strengthened and reached a tipping point on October 6, 2016 after a short 
video was edited and uploaded by a netizen named Buni Yani on his Facebook.7 This 
video, titled "Penistaan Terhadap Agama?", was circulated through various social media. 
The edited video presented Ahok making a statement, quoting verse 51 of the Surah Al 
Ma’idah that has been understood by some as besmirching the Qur'an and offending 
Muslims. In this statement, Ahok urges listeners 'not to be fooled' by those who use Al 
Ma’idah verse 51 of the Quran to claim that it is a sin for Muslims to vote for a non-
 
6 Switzy Sabandar. Riset UGM: Ahok dan Pilkada DKI Isu Paling Populer Sepanjang 2016. 
Retrieved from https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/2836414/riset-ugm-ahok-dan-pilkada-dki-isu-paling-
populer-sepanjang-2016. 
7 CNN Indonesia. Kronologi Kasus Buni Yani, Penyebar Video Ahok Soal Al Maidah. Retrieved 
from https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20161124075029-12-174911/kronologi-kasus-buni-yani-
penyebar-video-ahok-soal-al-maidah. 
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Muslim leader. This video eventually became the main trigger for the development of 
identity politics in Jakarta. It was employed by a number of elite political parties and 
candidates as a strategy to beat Ahok and Djarot in the first round. This strategy considered 
the demographics of Jakarta, where almost 85% of the population is Muslim. This video 
became viral and led to a variety of actions. At least seven actions, labeled Islamic martial 
and peace actions, were held:  
Table 1; Detail Chronology of Islamic Defense Actions during the  
Jakarta Gubernatorial Election 2017 
Name of 
Action 
Date and Place Initiator  Action  
Islamic 
Defense 
Action I 
October 14, 
2016, Istiqlal 
Mosque. Ended 
in front of 
Jakarta City Hall  
Thousands of 
Islamic 
organizations, led 
by the Islamic 
Defenders Front 
(Front Pembela 
Islam, FPI) 
This was the first action held 
by thousands of Islamic 
community organizations led 
by the FPI. The action started 
with Friday prayers at the 
Istiqlal Mosque, then 
continued in front of the 
Office of Criminal 
Investigation at the Ministry 
of Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries. It ended in front of 
the Jakarta City Hall. The 
masses demanded that Ahok 
be investigated by the police 
and charged with blasphemy. 
They threatened a larger 
action if the case did not 
resume in three weeks. 
Islamic 
Defense 
Action II 
November 4, 
2016, Istiqlal 
Mosque. Ended 
in front of 
Presidential 
Palace on West 
Merdeka Street 
 
Thousands of 
Islamic 
organizations, led 
by National 
Movement of Fatwa 
Enforcers for the 
Indonesian Ulema 
Council (Gerakan 
Nasional Pengawal 
Fatwa Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia, 
GNPF-MUI) 
Better known as Islamic 
Defense Action Volume II or 
the 411 Peace Action. This 
action was conducted in 
response to a view that the 
police investigation of Ahok 
was being conducted too 
slowly. To demand an 
immediate response, this 
action attempted to draw 
more participants and used 
the front of the Presidential 
Palace as its venue. In 
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addition to Jakarta, similar 
actions were also held in 
several other cities. Eleven 
days later, on November 15, 
2016, Ahok was named a 
suspect. 
Islamic 
Defense 
Action III 
December 2, 
2016, held on 
Sudirman Street 
and Thamrin 
Street, with the 
imam at Hotel 
Indonesia 
Boulevard 
(Bundaran HI) 
GNPF-MUI, FPI Better known as the 212 
Peace Action. This action 
involved peaceful Friday 
prayers together with 
President Joko Widodo. This 
activity was conducted to 
pray for the salvation of the 
country. In addition, this 
action was also done to 
protest Ahok not having been 
detained by the police despite 
having been named a suspect. 
Islamic 
Defense 
Action IV 
February 11, 
2017, held at 
Istiqlal Mosque 
Islamic 
Congregation 
Forum (Forum 
Umat Islam, FUI) 
and GNPF-MUI 
Better known as Action 112. 
This action was a follow-up 
action to Islamic Defense 
Actions I–III. It was carried 
out by holding a prayer 
recital and sermons at Istiqlal 
Mosque, Jakarta, after the 
Chairman of FPI and the 
leader of GNPF-MUI met 
with the Coordinating 
Minister for Politics, Law, 
and Security Wiranto. This 
action was another protest of 
the Ahok case. 
Islamic 
Defense 
Action V 
February 21, 
2017, held at the 
House of 
Representatives 
Senayan, Central 
Jakarta 
 
FUI 
 
Better known as Action 212. 
This action demanded that: 
First, Parliament/Senate send 
a letter to President Joko 
Widodo regarding the 
deactivation of Ahok. 
Second, Ahok be declared 
unfit to remain in office 
owing to his status as a 
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defendant accused of 
blasphemy. Third, Law 
enforcers stop accusing 
Islamic scholars and students 
of crime.  
Islamic 
Defense 
Action VI 
March 31, 2017. 
First held at 
Istiqlal Mosque, 
then moved to 
the Presidential 
Palace 
FUI and various 
Islamic groups/ 
organizations 
Better known as Action 313. 
This action demanded that 
President Joko Widodo 
dismiss Ahok from his 
position as Governor of 
Jakarta. At the time of this 
action, President Joko 
Widodo was meeting the 
Chairman of the Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI), KH 
Ma'rif Amin. 
Islamic 
Defense 
Action VII 
May 5, 2017. 
First held at 
Istiqlal Mosque, 
then moved to 
the Office of the 
Supreme Court 
GNPF-MUI Better known as Action 55. It 
was the closing act in the 
series of Islamic defensive 
actions. This action started 
with Friday prayers at Istiqlal 
Mosque, followed by a long 
march to the Supreme Court 
Office. This action was held 
before the verdict in Ahok's 
trial was read by the judges 
on 9 May 2017. In this action, 
protestors demanded that the 
Indonesian judicial 
institution maintain legal 
justice by punishing Ahok, 
who had been charged for 
blasphemy against Islam.  
Source: Processed from various related data, 2018. 
These various "Islamic defense actions" were intended to spread hatred and raise 
support for non-Muslim gubernatorial candidates being forbidden from running; this was 
targeted at Ahok, who held the status of double minority (Chinese and Christian). The 
seventh Islamic defense action in particular gave the impression that the election was 
being contested not between three gubernatorial potential candidates who had different 
visions and missions for realizing a better Jakarta over five years, but rather a battle 
between Muslim and non-Muslim leaders. This also proves the statement of Jeffrie 
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Geovanie who argues that Islam is often used as the basis of political ideology and the 
basis of political struggle.8 Or if we borrow the M.C. Ricklefs sentence, in Indonesia the 
symbols and concepts of Islam are so attractive in political contestation.9 
 
C. Framing Ahok's Leadership: Differentiating "Us" and "Them" 
Ahok's leadership as Governor of Jakarta, serving from Joko Widodo's resignation 
in 2014 until 2017, was framed through the raising of political identity ahead of local 
elections in Jakarta. Identity politics, reinforced through ethnic and religious issues, 
should not be relevant in any elections, including those in Jakarta. However, the use of 
identity politics indicates the region's local democracy. If we further examine the meaning 
of pilkada, we can look at Article 18, paragraph 4, of the 1945 Constitution, which 
stipulates, "Governors, Regents, and Mayors are elected democratically". The phrase 
'democratically elected', particularly its term 'democratic', can be interpreted with various 
definitions. In the context of local elections in Indonesia, the word 'democratically elected' 
means that the community must be actively involved in local elections so that every voter 
can use the political right to determine their leader. 
The basis of democracy is the rationality that measures candidates' capacity on the 
basis of their ability and how the electorate has the ability to choose leaders who are able 
to build Jakarta and bring prosperity to its residents through solutive programs rather than 
a basis of religious and tribal similarities. That identity politics were an issue in the 2017 
election indicates that it did not result in political transformation. Democratization follows 
the concept of liberal democracy, which emphasizes only free and open elections. 
Unfortunately, from year to year the power of political transformation was reduced and 
gave rise to political exclusion. This tendency was found not only in Jakarta, but also in 
other areas. This condition, of course, will lead to vulnerability in local democracy that 
impacts public distrust of democratic institutions.10 
Local elections should be a very important form of political expression, because 
the people have the right to elect regional leaders and expect them to serve the community, 
promote regional development, and serve the interests of the nation and state. In this 
context, Jakarta, which is the capital of Indonesia and home to the central government, is 
often used as a barometer of politics in the region, failed to realize that expectation. The 
Jakarta elections is inappropriate as an example for other regional elections, because the 
use of identity politics indicates that the election was not yet sufficiently mature as a local 
 
8 Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma and Theresia Octastefani. “Negosiasi Dakwah dan Politik Praktis: 
Membaca Orientasi Organisasi Sayap Keagamaan Islam pada Partai Nasionalis”. Al-Balagh: Jurnal 
Dakwah dan Komunkasi Vol. 2 No. 1 (2017), 3. 
9 Merle Calvin Ricklefs. Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and 
Religious History c. 1930 to the Present. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012). 275. 
10 See Muhtar Haboddin. “Menguatnya Politik Identitas di Ranah Lokal”. Jurnal Studi 
Pemerintahan Vol. 3 No. 1, (2012). 
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democratic process. This is quite unfortunate, especially since Jakarta has a separate law 
that has become lex specialis in gubernatorial elections: to be elected governor, a 
candidate must receive more than 50% of votes. This has been reinforced by Regulation 
of the General Elections Commission Number 6 of 2016. As such, the implementation of 
electoral democracy through educative ways in Jakarta is very important, as it can become 
a source of knowledge about local politics for other regions throughout Indonesia. Critical 
and transformative political reasoning must serve as the basis for choosing leaders and 
creating a substantive democracy in which residents act as active citizens.  
Ideally, the local election in Jakarta as capital city should provide the space and 
options for the community to select candidate leaders with strong capacity and 
commitment as well as social legitimacy, to ensure that any leader can enjoy the support 
and confidence of constituents, produce better decisions, and encourage a sense of mutual 
responsibility. In such a situation, the people will be more supportive of their elected 
leader's policies because the electorate has played a direct role in the leader's appointment. 
Unfortunately, the framing of Ahok through identity politics was used and controlled by 
political elites to strengthen the position of other gubernatorial candidates, particularly 
before the first round of elections was held on February 15, 2017. 
 
Table 2; Analysis of Political Strength in the First-Round 
Aspect Agus–Sylvi Ahok–Djarot Anies–Sandi 
   
Number  1 2 3 
Personal Profile Agus: Indonesian 
citizen, the eldest son 
of ex-Indonesian 
President Susilo 
Bambang 
Yudhoyono, ex-an 
infantry major in the 
Indonesian Army 
Ahok: Indonesian 
citizens of Chinese 
descent, incumbent 
governor of Jakarta  
Anies: Indonesian 
citizens of Arabic 
descent, 
academician, 
Former Minister of 
Education and 
Culture (2014–
2016) 
Sylvi: Indonesian 
citizen, local 
government 
bureaucrat, 
academician 
Djarot: Indonesian 
citizen, local 
government 
bureaucrat, 
academician 
Sandiaga: 
Indonesian citizen, 
entrepreneur  
Religion Muslim – Muslim Christian – Muslim Muslim – Muslim 
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Political Party 1. Democratic 
Party/PD (10 
seats) 
2. National 
Awakening Party 
/PKB (6 seats) 
3. United 
Development 
Party /PPP (10 
seats) 
4. National Mandate 
Party/PAN (2 
seats) 
1. Indonesian 
Democratic Party 
of Struggle/PDI-P 
(28 seats) 
2. National 
Democratic Party/ 
Nasdem (5 seats) 
3. Functional Groups 
Party / Golkar (9 
seats) 
4. People's 
Conscience Party/ 
Hanura (10 seats) 
1. Greater Indonesia 
Movement Party/ 
Gerindra (15 
seats) 
2. Prosperous 
Justice Party/PKS 
(11 seats) 
Number of 
seats in the 
Jakarta 
Parliament 
28 seats (26.4%) 52 seats (49.1%) 26 seats (24.5%) 
 
Source: Processed from various related data, 2018. 
 
Based on the above table, running mates’ number 2 (Ahok–Djarot) were superior 
in terms of political support, as they were carried by four nationalist political parties that 
had the largest number of seats in the Jakarta Regional Parliament. As such, the political 
base of Ahok–Djarot was much stronger than that of the other candidates. Hope of an 
Ahok victory still existed, despite the opposition's focus on Ahok's identity as a dual 
minority and the blasphemy charges that emerged in the middle of the campaign. In the 
first round of voting results, Ahok–Djarot outperformed the other candidates. They 
received 2,357,785 votes (42.96%). In second place were Anies–Sandi, who received 
2,193,530 votes (39.97%). Agus–Sylvi obtained the least votes, only 936,461 (17.06%). 
The results of the first-round election can be seen in the following picture. 
 
Picture 1; Vote Count in the First-Round Election 
 
Al Izzah: Jurnal Hasil-Hasil Penelitian-ISSN: 1978-9726 (p); 2541-0717 (e) 
Volume 14, Nomor 2 (November, 2019)) 
 
114 
Theresia Octastefani 
Source: Official Website of KPU of East Jakarta City.11 
 
Unfortunately, none of the candidates managed to obtain the 50% + 1 vote required 
to immediately claim the election. As such, the Jakarta Elections Commission was 
required to hold a second round of elections in which Ahok–Djarot and Anies–Sandi 
competed to win the hearts of the people of Jakarta. Various efforts were made by both 
candidates during the second round of the campaign. On April 19, 2017, the second-round 
election was held. The results of the vote count are below. 
Picture 2; Vote Count in the Second-Round Election 
 
Source: Official website of KPU of the Republic of Indonesia.12 
 
The second-round result of the Jakarta election concluded with a victory for 
Anies–Sandi, who will respectively begin their terms as governor and vice-governor in 
October 2017. Anies–Sandi received the most votes, 3,240,332 votes (57.95%), while 
Ahok–Djarot were only able to obtain 2,351,245 votes (42.05%). Comparing the results 
of the first and second rounds of the election, it can be seen that Anies–Sandi gained votes 
from persons who had previously supported Agus-Silvi, while Ahok–Dajarot received 
6540 votes (0.27%) fewer votes than in the first round. A detailed comparison of the vote 
count is as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 General Elections Commission of East Jakarta City. 2017. Retrieved from http://kpu-
jakartatimurkota.go.id/hasil-pilgub-dki-diperkirakan-dua-putaran/ 
12 General Elections Commission of the Republic of Indonesia, “Pilkada Provinsi DKI Jakarta 
(Putaran Kedua)”, 2017, Retrieved from: https://pilkada2017.kpu.go.id/hasil/2/t1/dki_jakarta 
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Table 3; Comparative Analysis of the Results of First and Second Round Election 
Candidates 1st round 2nd round 
Votes % Votes % 
Agus–Sylvi 936,461 17.06   
Ahok–
Djarot 
2,357,785 42.96 2,351,245 42.05 
Anies–
Sandi 
2,193,530 39.97 3,240,332 57.95 
Source: Processed by author from the official website of KPU of the Republic of Indonesia 
and East Jakarta City, 2017. 
 
The defeat of Ahok–Djarot in the second round was predicted by a number of 
political circles, as well as survey agencies and public consultants.13 The cause of this 
pair's defeat can be attributed to a number of reasons. First, most of losing voters of Agus–
Silvi in first round choose to give their vote to Anies–Sandi in the second round. Second, 
the policy promoted by Ahok–Djarot was not considered pro-people. In a number of 
debates conducted before the first and second round of elections, some people of Jakarta 
gained the impression that Ahok–Djarot were not pro-people, as especially shown in 
policies related to settlement and reclamation in North Jakarta. 
Third, religious and primordial issues were capitalized. Some people who were 
against the policy of Ahok compounded this with various SARA issues. Ahok was deemed 
to no longer be worthy of leading Jakarta in the next period, especially since he was facing 
legal issues for allegedly defaming religion. As he was ensnared in a legal case, this further 
strengthened sentiment towards Ahok, and some Jakarta voters no longer wanted to be led 
by people who embraced a different religion than that embraced by the majority of 
Jakarta's population. Fourth, Ahok's communication style seemed arrogant and rude. In 
his nearly three years leading Jakarta, Ahok was considered arrogant and rude when 
communicating. This type of communication was considered inappropriate for future 
leadership of Jakarta. 
Fifth, inconsistent progress was made on individual tracts. Formerly, Ahok 
intended to progress through independent channels and not use political parties. Ahok was 
then greeted enthusiastically by a number of democracy activists, especially younger ones 
who were tired of political transactions between candidates and political party leaders. 
This led to the emergence of various volunteer groups for Ahok, including Friends of 
Ahok, DAG DKI, etc. Unfortunately, ahead of the registration period, Ahok did not 
receive sufficient support (in the form of residents' identity cards), and as a result he ran 
through political parties. Sixth, was the emergence of two other new candidates. The 
 
13 See Tempo. Enam Lembaga Rilis Hasil Survei Pilkada DKI, Ahok Unggul. Retrieved from 
https://pilkada.tempo.co/read/840828/enam-lembaga-rilis-hasil-survei-pilkada-dki-ahok-unggul. 
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presence of Agus–Silvi and Anies–Sandi in the election gave voters an alternative in 
determining who would lead Jakarta. 
The defeat of the incumbent pair on April 19, 2017 did not necessarily draw the 
masses to discuss the pros and cons of each candidate. The legal case against Ahok 
continued until finally, on May 9, 2017, the Panel of Judges read the verdict against him: 
Ahok was found guilty of blasphemy and sentenced to two years imprisonment, despite 
having only been sentenced to one year in prison and a two-year probation in a previous 
case. Ahok fell afoul of Article 156a of the Criminal Code, handling religious defamation, 
and received a punishment stricter than that demanded by the prosecution's demands that 
he be charged under Article 156 on the expression of hostility and hatred towards a group. 
This punishment has become the biggest test for religious tolerance faced in the 
heterogeneous Indonesia. A sense of "unity" has been lost in the process of 
democratization and decentralization. This is as confirmed by Santoso,14 who states that 
"when discussing democracy, what we highlight are only the actions of public officials, 
as if we do not do the same. We demand a change of system, but there is no seriousness 
to contribute to the realization and consolidation of the system we want." This statement 
is very interesting and appropriate to describe the condition in Jakarta today. 
With the passing of the verdict, Ahok could not complete his leadership until the 
end of his period as governor of Jakarta. Ahok was deactivated from his position following 
the stipulations in Article 83, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, of Law No. 23 of 2014 regarding the 
dismissal of regional leaders. First paragraph  reads "The regional head and/or deputy 
regional head shall be temporarily suspended without going through the proposal of the 
Regional Parliament if charged with committing a criminal offense punishable by a 
maximum imprisonment of 5 (five) years, corruption, terrorism, criminal offenses against 
state security, and/or other acts which may divide the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia".  
Meanwhile, second paragraph reads "A regional head and/or deputy head who 
becomes a defendant as referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be suspended by court register 
in court". Moreover, third paragraph states, "The temporary dismissal of the regional head 
and/or deputy regional head referred to in Paragraph (1) and Paragraph (2) shall be enacted 
by the President for governors and/or vice governors and by the Minister for regents and/or 
deputy regents or mayors and/or deputy mayors”. Under these articles, Ahok's position as 
Governor of Jakarta was suspended. To avoid vacancy of office and enable the continued 
practice of gubernatorial duties, Djarot Saiful Hidayat replaced Ahok as Acting Governor. 
 
 
 
14 Purwo Santoso. “Menolak Stagnasi Demokratisasi: Otonomi Daerah sebagai Aktualisasi”. 
Riptek Vol. 5 No. 1 (2011), 5-60. 
 
Al Izzah: Jurnal Hasil-Hasil Penelitian-ISSN: 1978-9726 (p); 2541-0717 (e) 
Volume 14, Nomor 2 (November, 2019)) 
 
117 
Theresia Octastefani 
D. What’s Next: In-Depth Concern for the Prospect of Local Democracy in 
Jakarta? 
The implementation of local democratization through local elections is expected 
to answer the need for improving the quality of democracy. The practice of strong party 
oligarchy in the local elections system through legislative members is irrelevant, 
especially in this time of reform. This means that local elections are necessary to test the 
public's ability to elect democratic regional heads and truly realize democratization. The 
higher the quality of community participation will make the better the quality of the 
community in determining who will lead the area. If we look at the post-election situation 
in Jakarta, the question arises the future prospects for local democracy in Jakarta. Were 
the groups opposed to Ahok finally able to control their anger after Ahok was sentenced 
to jail and lost in the second round of elections? Was the group that supported Ahok 
ultimately able to accept the victory of Anies–Sandi and the court's verdict? After the 
second round of elections, will the residents of Jakarta be able to co-exist again? All of 
these questions will be analyzed further using the political representation approach. 
The author realizes that there has been a change in the concept of representation 
along with the dynamics of political change. Referring to the concept of representation 
presented by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin in her book entitled The Concept of Representation 
explains that representation is divided into four categories, namely: first, formalistic 
representation, understood as political representation that takes place within formal 
representative institutions. Second, substantive representation is a model of representation 
in which a representative acts for those who are represented. Third, descriptive 
representation is understood as a form of representation where a representative stands for 
objectively similar people. Fourth, symbolic representation refers to those who are 
represented but in terms of the similarity of identity and culture.15 Based on the 
categorization of Pitkin's representation, Törnquist offers a new approach to 
understanding representation. 
Törnquist and Warouw explains in contemporary political representation is related 
to four main elements, namely: in a political context, representation requires 
representatives, the represented, and something being represented. First, representatives 
are a group of people who represent well in formal representative institutions. Second, 
what is represented refers to the presence of a group of people represented where they can 
be constituents or clients. Third, something that is represented refers to the existence of 
interests, opinions, or political preferences. Fourth, the political context underlying this 
representation.16 
 
15 Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation. (California: University Of California Press, 
1967). 
16 Olle Törnquist and Nicolaas Warouw. “Memahami Demokrasi: Beberapa Catatan Pendahuluan 
tentang Konsep dan Metode”. in Willy Purna Samadhi and Nicolaas Warouw (eds.). Building Democracy 
on the Sand: Advances and Setbacks in Indonesia. (Yogyakarta and Jakarta: PCD Press and Demos, 2009). 
19-44. 
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Furthermore, Törnquist, Webster, and Stokke divides representative forms into 
three categories. The first of these is symbolic representation, which refers to the extent 
to which representatives act to represent the represented and also the 'stands for' (i.e. 
cultural similarity and identity). Second is descriptive representation, which refers to the 
extent to which representatives can represent the 'stands for' of the persons they represent. 
Third is substantive representation, which is realized when those representing 'act for' their 
represented interests. Based on this discussion, my analysis indicates that the political 
situation in the Jakarta elections are directed more towards symbolic representation. This 
symbolic representation only emphasizes the necessity of a representative, without 
questioning the substance. This is evident from the electoral process, both before the first 
and second round of elections, where the citizens of Jakarta as voters were kept busy with 
issues of religion and ethnicity rather than candidates' visions, missions, and programs. 
See picture 3 below.  
Picture 3; An Inclusive Model for the Study of Democracy oriented Representation 
 
Source: Olle Törnquist, 2009.17 
 
 
 
17 Olle Törnquist. “Power, Conflict and Democracy: The Analytical Framework”. PCD Journal: 
Power, Conflict, and Democracy Vol. 1 No. 1 & 2 (2009), 22. 
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The picture above is a representation study framework offered by Törnquist to 
map and analyze studies not only seen from the workings of formal political 
representation, but also to offer a new approach to understanding the existence of informal 
political representation paths. This information is indicated by the presence of 
representative channels involving groups of community organizations (NGOs), civic 
groups, certain political elites, etc. which are represented based on similarities in identity 
(ethnicity, religion, interests, etc.) which have an influence on formal political 
representation. 
The election of Anies–Sandi as Governor and Vice Governor of Jakarta for 2017–
2022 illustrates that voters have a tendency to vote because of similarities in culture and 
identity. The widespread efforts to spread identity politics of various movements and 
actors, both from the top and bottom, worked to form 'the people' and establish the 
candidates' authority as legitimate representatives. The quality of political participation 
among Jakarta residents can also be seen from the extent of voter autonomy and literacy 
in determining positions. Were voters mobilized by political parties per se, or by 
primordial factors lacking rationality or conscience? If political alignments were 
established based on rational considerations, it is a positive sign for developing democracy 
and determining the format of the future. However, if the political choice of Jakarta 
citizens was motivated by the influence of identity politics, the future of democracy should 
be questioned. Symbolic representation will underlie the leadership of Anies–Sandi over 
the next five years. 
 
E. Local Democracy and Transformative Politics in the Transition Period 
The election in Jakarta 2017 should have been a moment for residents of Jakarta 
to conduct free elections unconditionally, without coercion from any party. However, 
during the process of democracy, some parties deliberately focused on issues that could 
lead to conflict. This can be seen in problems from previous elections. On May 10, 2016, 
the online newspaper Republika.co.id reported that, during the 2014 Presidential Election, 
then-presidential candidate Joko Widodo was branded as Chinese, communist, etc. by his 
opponents.18 Similar primordial issues were used as ammunition during the Jakarta 
election 2017. Social media was widely used to disseminate discussions that exploited 
issues of religion and ethnicity. This identity politics is deeply concerning. 
These destabilizing identity politics may be successfully contained, and dominant 
political actors may be largely reconciled to the democratic “rules of the game”.19 
However, the emergence of identity themes such as Muslim, infidel, and Chinese in 
Indonesia's political sphere may actually tear at the woven unity that has been knitted. 
 
18 Republika, "Isu SARA di Pilgub DKI 2017 Semakin Menggila", 2016, Retrieved from 
http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/jabodetabek-nasional/16/05/10/o6ybdo282-isu-sara-
dipilgub-dki-2017-semakin-menggila 
19 Olle Törnquist, “Stagnation or Transformation in Indonesia?”, Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 
XLIX No. 50 (2014), 23-27. 
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Even more concerning, some parties have capitalized on these identity politics. For 
instance, Ahok frequently repurposed identity issues to attack his opponents. He once 
made a statement, "Even though I am an infidel, I am not corrupt". This statement was not 
muffled, but instead increasingly contributed to the shape of politics before the Jakarta 
gubernatorial election. 
The development of local democracy in Indonesia, in general, has focused more 
on figures who occupy the position of regional leader. There is a tendency for political 
parties and mass organizations to become less important in the electoral process, even as 
some use political parties and mass organizations to mobilize voters during elections. 
Efforts to Islamicize the plural Jakarta community through ethnic, racial, and religious 
emotional ties are meant predominantly to enhance political power. Can simultaneous 
elections realize transformative democratic politics? Political transformation is very 
important in the realization of substantive democracy in which a transformative leader is 
able to make significant changes. The deepening of democracy is not merely procedural. 
As such, attempts to activate citizens’ political rights and create active citizens are  most 
important in building local democracy in Jakarta. Sincerity in appreciating 
democratization and decentralization as a matter of political transformation is thus 
necessary.20 A nation's identity is not formed by itself, but through a lengthy process and 
struggle. Processing locality into nationality means processing of ethnic identity, religion, 
and plural fused groups into a nation that is "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika", "Many but One". 
This diversity must be compared, not contested. It is a manifestation of ideas and values 
that are mutually reinforcing and increase insight in mutual appreciation. 
As the result of this analysis, there are several critical reflections regarding the 
Jakarta gubernatorial election, as follows. First, Muslim critics and power relations. The 
relationship between religion and politics is very dynamic, unique, and interesting. 
Sometimes the two exist side by side, while other times they contradict each other. 
Religion can perform its critical function as a medium of social criticism within society, 
as well as a means of political change. Officially, ethnicity, religion, race, and class had 
been political no-go areas in Indonesia, implying that public discourse about these topics 
was under close surveillance.21 The relationship between religion and politics is 
determined by which authority is the most powerful and dominant, as well as the character 
of religious and political elites. In this context, criticism appears very strong and is 
mobilized by hardliners who are intolerant, anti-pluralist, and counter-nationalist. They 
use primordial religious and ethnic considerations to achieve their political-economic 
interests. The mass mobilization involved in Islamic Defense Actions I–VII is a small but 
 
20 Purwo Santoso, “Menolak Stagnasi Demokratisasi: Otonomi Daerah sebagai Aktualisasi”, Riptek 
Vol. 5 No. 1 (2011), 45-60 
21 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “Decentralisation in Indonesia: Less State, More Democracy?”, in John 
Harriss, Kristian Stokke, and Olle Törnquist (eds), Politicising Democracy: The New Local Politics of 
Democratisation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 45. 
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striking example of religious politics. If this relationship is not well managed, the spirit of 
democracy that has faced extensive difficulties will be buried in the future. 
Second, gap in modern growth: social and economic capital. Social and economic 
vulnerability in Jakarta are a logical consequence of the city's position as a political, social, 
economic, etc. center. As the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta is the foundation for the lives 
of millions of people living in the midst of economic growth. Vigorous development, in 
the form of rows of skyscrapers on various protocol roads and in business centers, can be 
seen by the naked eye. However, this development progress has not given birth to 
economic equity. Harriss, Stokke, and Törnquist write that:22 
"The apparent weaknesses, however, of both the modernisation and the structural 
approaches for the explanation of the third wave of democratisation have certainly 
contributed to the ascendancy in the contemporary literature of the 'transition' 
approach, exemplified in the work of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Linz and 
Stepan (1996) and others, which focuses on the agency of political elites." 
This further reinforces the gap in the various cases of social and economic 
disparities between the rich and poor residents of Jakarta. This issue was central in the 
election campaign. Each candidate has a program to solve this problem. This issue 
received serious attention, as well as criticism that should be accommodated by each 
candidate. 
Third, money politics: transactionalism. Money politics has always been present 
in every regional election. The practice of money politics varies from the distribution of 
donations (in the form of goods or money) to the abuse of authority and state facilities for 
the benefit of a candidate or political party bearer. As stated by the Indonesian Corruption 
Watch (ICW) on its official website, the organization has received numerous reports of 
alleged political transactions and money politics.23 Furthermore, the Electoral Supervisory 
Body for Jakarta received information about alleged practices of money politics, taking 
the form basic foods being distributed by supporters of each candidate before the second 
round of voting. With these basic foods, supporters distributed flyers inviting voters to 
select specific candidates. This alleged practice of money politics has become a critical 
note in the implementation of the elections in Jakarta. 
Fourth, mass mobilization. In terms of mass mobilization, opinion wars—often 
filled with religious and ethnic issues—were very easily disseminated through various 
print, electronic, and social media. This can be seen in various posts in print, online, and 
social, including Twitter and Facebook. Some time ago, one group held a convention to 
 
22 John Harriss, Kristian Stokke, and Olle Törnquist, “Introduction: The New Local Politics of 
Demoratisation”, in John Harriss, Kristian Stokke, and Olle Törnquist (eds.), Politicising Democracy: The 
New Local Politics of Democratisation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 5. 
23 Indonesian Corruption Watch, "Pilkada DKI Jakarta di Bawah Ancaman Politik Uang dan 
Intimidasi", 2017, Retrieved from http://www.antikorupsi.org/id/content/pilkada-dki-di-bawah-ancaman-
politik-uang-dan-intimidasi 
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search for a Muslim candidate to challenge Ahok in the election. The use of religious and 
ethnic issues to attack other groups before the election in Jakarta 2017 was certainly not 
healthy for the development of democracy in Jakarta and in Indonesia and may even 
threaten social relations and social security. The media should play an important role in 
political communication. Its interactive nature allows the political communication process 
to be done more intensely during the course of democratic life. Print, electronic, and social 
media should be utilized as an effective means of political communication to interact with 
the public and convey each candidate's political aspirations as well as to influence voters. 
With its political messages uploaded, each potential candidate can influence the general 
public through positive or negative support or through criticism. In the context of the 
Jakarta Election, uploads of videos depicting Ahok were a real and effective strategy used 
to attack him by claiming blasphemy. In a democracy, public opinion can be massively 
mobilized through the mass media. 
Last, personality politics. Local elections are important tools for regenerating 
national leadership. Whether realized or not, the stock of national leadership is a very 
limited percentage of Indonesia's total population of more than 250 million people. These 
are mostly leaders of major political parties that won the 2004 elections. As such, hope 
for the rise of national leaders precisely from simultaneous local elections. Unfortunately, 
the condition differs from expectations. The new reality of Indonesia's local democracy is 
aimed precisely at the politics of cadres. Ahok was not respected by his political opponents 
for taking anti-corruption measures or for becoming a progressive actor at the provincial 
level. From these critical records, we must transform democracy into more than a form or 
state identity. It must become a praxis (Santoso, 2011, p.45). Transformation must be 
realized in the local democratization process in Indonesia, so that it becomes more than 
mere discourse. 
 
F. Concluding Remarks 
The Jakarta Gubernatorial Election 2017 can be used as a means of understanding 
local democracy in regions that will hold their local elections in the future, at least until 
2027. The management of regional identity must show the diverse characteristics of the 
nation. As a unitary state, Indonesia is formed from various cultures and ethnicities, based 
on Pancasila, and the value of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Therefore, Jakarta, as a home for 
people of various religions and ethnic groups, should have the ability to manage multiple 
identities and safeguard coexistence as a manifestation of tolerance towards difference 
and diversity. Unity in diversity must serve as a directive, guideline, and reference for 
every person involved in building and maintaining national life, because Indonesian 
society is a multicultural one. 
Cases of blasphemy should not occur if different believers are able to respect and 
value each other. In addition, if successful candidates for regional leader understand the 
true value of the diversity embodied in the slogan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, they should not 
use identity issues to win elections, because such issues benefit only their own group's 
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interests and not those of the nation and state. Therefore, it is important to create regional 
elections with zero conflict, as well as post-election periods in which efforts are made to 
restore harmony. Identity politics in Jakarta elections was used as a popular movement by 
some religious and political elites, not to promote the welfare of Jakarta's residents. 
Welfare issues appear to have worked because citizens became preoccupied with debates 
over religion and ethnicity. The elections in Jakarta 2017 offered momentum for the nation 
to learn from practices of local democracy that are expected to form a collective awareness 
about the importance of choosing leadership according to one's conscience. 
Transformative democratic politics cannot be realized if voters lack the ability to 
determine the pace of governance (ability to govern) in the future. 
The Jakarta Gubernatorial Election shows the reality of the strengthening of 
symbolic representation compared to substantive representation. For this reason, in 
deepening democracy, the transformation from symbolic representation to substantive 
representation is a crucial part of collaborating in improving the quality of local 
democracy. 
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